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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GRANT S. JOHNSON,

)
)
)

REPLY TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING

)

Case No. 890321-CA

)

Defendant and Respondent.

)

Pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals and at the request of the Court, Defendant
and Respondent Grant S. Johnson hereby replies to the
State's Petition for Rehearing of the dismissal entered
by the Court in its Memorandum Decision in this case
filed October 30, 1989, and published in 120 Utah Adv.
Rep. 40.
DISCUSSION
The Petition for Rehearing raises a question
about only one aspect of this Courtfs Memorandum Decision,
namely, whether the Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing
filed January 3, 1989 (the "Motion to Reopen")

extended

the time for the State to appeal from the dismissal of
charges against defendant.

Respondent will not respond

to the other issues in that they are not affected by
the Petition for Rehearing.
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I.

The timeliness issue raised by the Petition

for Rehearing appears to be well taken.
Under the rules and statutes cited in the Petition
for Rehearing, the Motion to Reopen was filed within
the time allowed for filing a motion for a new trial
under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Because under Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals f

this Court may make a final disposition of

the cause without reargument, defendant believes it is
appropriate for this Court to dismiss the appeal on other
grounds, set forth in the this Memorandum.
II.

This Court has no jurisdiction over an

appeal of a dismissal at preliminary hearing.
Rule 26(3) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that the prosecution may appeal from
"a final judgment of dismissal."

The Circuit Court's

Order of dismissal after the preliminary hearing in this
case is not a final order of dismissal because it did
not prevent refiling of the same criminal charges against
defendant under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
This case is distinguishable from State v. Gomez
722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986).

That case held that the State

could appeal from a trial court's dismissal of charges
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because of its determination that two statutes proscribed
identical conduct, so the defendants could be charged
only under the lesser offense.

The court stated "the

trial court's determination that the charges should be
reduced to an offense carrying a lesser penalty not charged
in the original information prevented the State from
proceeding on the original charges."
supra, at 749.

State v. Gomez,

Because the trial court had determined

a question of law regarding the interpretation of the
statutes involved, the State could not have refiled the
charges without a reversal of the decision on appeal
because of the operation of res judicata.

If the state

had proceded to trial on the reduced charges, a trial
on the greater charge would have been barred by double
jeopardy.

The dismissal after preliminary hearing in

this case was the result of the Circuit Court's factual
determination that the evidence did not establish probable
cause.

That finding would not preclude a later filing

of the same charges against defendant, and for that reason
the order of dismissal in this case was not a final order
of dismissal.
The question before this Court is not whether
the state should have an avenue of appeal from a dismissal
at preliminary hearing, but whether the legislature has
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provided one.

Prior to the Brickey decision there was

no need for an avenue of appeal from a dismissal order
of the Circuit Court.

The limitations imposed upon the

state's abilility to refile charges pursuant to Brickey
may have created a need for such an appellate review.
However, the legislature has not seen fit to provide
for one. The absence of such a statutory appellate procedure
raises no issues of constitutional dimension and it would
be improper for this Court to supercede Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and judicially create
such a provision.
Recognition by this Court of a right of appeal
by the state would create equal protection problems between
felonies filed in Circuit Court and those filed by rural
counties in the justice courts pursuant to §78-5-104(c).
1
The problem is created by the absence of an
appellate review procedure from justice court.

§78-5-120

(U.C.A. 1953 as amended) provides "any person not satisfied
with a judgment rendered in justice court, whether rendered

^This case was originally filed in the justice court of
Garfield County. The defendant's motion to transfer
to Circuit Court was granted in spite of the state's
opposition. The transfer was granted prior to the amendment
of 78-5-104 (c) which now authorizes preliminary hearing
in justice court.
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by default or after trial is entitled to a trial de novo
in the Circuit Court."

The rules of this court likewise

do not provide for an appeal from justice court.

Should

this court accept the state's appeal from the Circuit
Court dismissal it would seem that the court would also
have to grant that same right of appeal to justice court
litigants who are similarly situated.

Defendant submits

that such an expansion of appellate procedures is contrary
to the established structure in this state.
Until the legislature creates a statutory scheme
which specifies what is appealable, the standards, procedures
and time limits for such a review, the state has no right
to appeal a dismissal by the magistrate at preliminary
hearing.
III. The motion to reopen was not the equivalent
of a motion for new trial, and therefore the appeal was
not timely, even if an appeal is authorized if timely
filed.
This Court's Memorandum Decision in this case
determined that "even if liberally construed as a motion
for a new trial, the motion to reopen was not timely
under Rule 24 and did not toll the time in which to appeal
from the dismissal." State v. Johnson, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. at
41.

Because it appears the Motion to Reopen was filed

6
within the time for filing a motion for a new trial,
this Court should decide whether the Motion to Reopen
should properly be construed as a motion for a new trial.
The Motion

to Reopen was made

"pursuant

to

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-7 and State v. Brickey,
714 P. 2d 644

(Utah 1986)."

Attached to the Motion to

Reopen was a copy of Brickey and a proposed new information.2
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (U.C.A.
§77-35-7

(8) (c) provides that if after the preliminary

hearing the magistrate finds no probable cause and dismisses
the information, "the dismissal and discharge do not
preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense."

State v. Brickey places due process

limitations on that right, requiring the charges be refiled
before the magistrate who dismissed them, if possible,
and requiring a showing of new or previously unavailable
evidence or other good cause.

The magistrate is then

to examine the new evidence to determine if it is "sufficient
to require a re-examination and possible reversal of
the earlier decision dismissing the charges."
at 647.

Brickey

The purpose of the Brickey constraints is to

prevent harrassment of defendants by

^Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing, Exhibit "B" to
the Docketing Statedment filed in this case.
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repeated filings of the same charges.
A Brickey motion can be made at any time before
the statute of limitations runs on the charged offense.
The fact it is made within ten days of the decision dismissing
charges is irrelevant.

A Brickey motion is fundamentally

and functionally different from a motion for new trial.
A Brickey motion does not challenge or assert error in
the magistrate's order of dismissal. It asks the magistrate
to consider new or previously unavailable evidence not
presented at the preliminary hearing.

It argues that

new evidence should provide a basis for a different result
at a new or supplementary preliminary hearing.

That

is exactly the substance and intention of the Motion
to Reopen filed in this case.
The Motion to Reopen did not cite, refer to,
or rely on Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
regarding motions for new trial.

That rule provides

in relevant part that the Court may "grant a new trial
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of a party," and requires that a Motion for new
trial be filed within ten days after imposition of sentence.
The Motion to Reopen alleged no error or impropriety.
Courts of other states have recognized that
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an appeal from an order of dismissal and an attempt to
refile charges based on new evidence after dismissal
of those charges are distinct and unrelated procedures.
The decision in Brickey relied on and adopted the reasoning
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Jones v. State, 481
P.2d 169 (Okl. Cr. 1971). After that decision, the Oklahoma
Court adopted a rule allowing an appeal from a dismissal
at preliminary hearing and instituting specific procedures
to take such an appeal.

In Morgan v. State, 675 P.2d

473 (Okl. Cr. 1984), the Oklahoma appeals court determined
that those rules had not been followed and that an appeal
could not be taken from the order of dismissal, but noted
that though an appeal was prohibited, the decision was
"without prejudice to the refiling of the charge under
Jones v. State.

. . . Refiling under Jones and appeal

... are alternative modes of procedure for the State."
Id., at 476.
The State of Kansas allows both an appeal from
an order of dismissal at preliminary hearing and the
refiling of the Complaint if additional witnesses or
new evidence are discovered.

In State v. Zimmerman,

660 P. 2d 960 (Kan. 1983), the defendant contended that
the state could not appeal from an order of dismissal
without making an attempt to refile the charges.

The

9
Kansas Supreme Court stated "the possibility that the
state may choose not to appeal the District Court's order
and instead refile the complaint should additional witnesses
or new evidence be procured does not alter the right
to appeal clearly authorized by the statute."

Id., at

963.
The stay of the time periods for appellate
review while a motion for a new trial is heard makes
sense in that it allows the lower court to consider the
motions prior to the appellate review, and it avoids
requiring the parties to be in two forums simultaneously.
Those dual purposes are not served when it is a Brickey
motion that is filed in the lower court.

As previously

discussed, an appeal from the magistrate's dismissal
involves a claim of a legal error committed by the judge
during the proceedings.

Conversely, a Brickey motion

deals the sufficiency and weight of the evidence produced
subsequent to that hearing.

Accordingly, the lower court

is never asked to consider the issues which form the
basis of the appeal and there is nothing to be gained
by a stay of the appellate procedings.
Additionally, the Brickey motion can be filed
at any time.

The policy of avoiding two forums litigating

the same case disappears within the practicalities of
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the situation.

The likely time for the discovery of

new or previously unavailable evidence is well beyond
the ten days following the preliminary hearing.

It is

most likely to be discovered during the pendency of the
appeal.

If the state has a right to appeal the dismissal,

it is unavoidable as a practical matter that the parties
will be in two forums at the same time.
In that there is no statutory authorization
for treating a Brickey motion as a motion for a new trial,
it should only be done if it serves the same purposes
as that motion.

Defendant submits that it does not and

its filing should not toll the time allowed for the filing
of an appeal. This Court should rule that making a Brickey
Motion, even if within ten days of a dismissal after
preliminary hearing, does not extend the time to appeal
the dismissal.

The right to appeal a dismissal and to

seek to refile charges are distinct and separate remedies.
IV.

Even if the Notice of Appeal was timely,

the appeal should be dismissed because the dismissal
was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
Counsel for defendant have been unable to locate
any Utah cases in which there has been an appeal from
a dismissal at preliminary hearing, so there is no case
law on the standard of review of such a dismissal.

In
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Idaho, the trial court's decision on probable cause will
be overturned only on a showing that the magistrate abused
his discretion.
787 (1979).

State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 619 P. 2d

The facts found by a judge in a criminal

case and its verdict based on those facts are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard of review, and an
appeals court will not overturn such findings unless
they are against the clear weight of the evidence or
unless the appellate court reaches the firm and definite
conviction that a mistake has been made.
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

State v. Walkerf

Under either standard, it

is appropriate for this Court to affirm the order of
dismissal because the grounds for review are so insubstantial
as not to merit further consideration by this Court.
As shown by the issues stated in the Docketing
Statement filed by the State in this case, there is no
exception taken to any of the Findings of Fact made by
the Circuit Court.

Those findings, attached as Exhibit

"A" to the Docketing Statement, included findings that
none of the shoes or boots seized from defendant's trailer
matched the footprints which had been followed, that
the Deer Creek Ranch contains more than one dwelling
unit or site, and that the state's criminalist concluded
that the plaster casts of shoe impressions taken from
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the trail of footprints leading away from the damaged
bulldozers were different than the shoes and boots actually
seized by the officers from the defendant's trailer.
(Findings 41, 2, 12, 13, 50) .

In the Circuit Court's

Order on Motion to Reopen Preliminary Hearing, attached
as Exhibit

W

C M to the Docketing Statement, the Circuit

Court stated:

"One of the chief reasons for the earlier

dismissal of charges revolved around footprints. Specifically, the Court felt that the State had failed to show
a connection between the defendant and the footprints
found at the crime scene."
Based on the undisputed Findings of Fact of
the Circuit Court, there is clearly evidence to support
its finding of no probable cause for a bindover.

This

Court should not substitute its judgment on that factual
issue for that of the Circuit Court.

Whether the standard

of review is an abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous
standard, there is no basis for overturning the decision
of the Circuit Court that no probable cause existed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant
respectfully requests that the Court's earlier decision
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of dismissal of the State's appeal be affirmed.
DATED this

2*V

day of November, 1989.
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP

David J\ Bird
Attorney for Defendant
& Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, DAVID J. BIRD, counsel for defendant and
respondent, certify that a true and correct copy of the
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Wallace A. Lee
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
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Patrick B. Nolan
Deputy Garfield County Attorney
110 North 100 West
Logan, UT
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